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After years of stagnation Japanese investment in India has gathered momentum. In 2008 
Japan was the fourth largest investor in India. In this context Srabani’s study attempts to 
bridge an important gap in the research on Japan’s foreign direct investment in India. Based 
on a survey of actual firm-level experiences of a selected number of Japanese companies this 
study undertakes a qualitative assessment of the business environment in India. The objective 
is not simply to understand what needs to be done by Indian policy makers to improve the 
investment climate.  Not surprisingly the Japanese companies emphasize continuity of policy 
irrespective of political change, removal of the bottlenecks in administration, more e-enabled 
procedures to facilitate faster operations, more transparency in taxation and approvals, 
priority to infrastructure development and aligning of technical education to the needs of 
industry. The value addition this study brings is in highlighting the productive experience of 
the Japanese companies operating in India. Indeed, the key findings that the surveyed firms 
entered India with a long-term orientation and are expanding their operations can hopefully 
help in dispelling the myths and misnomers widely prevalent in the minds of potential 
Japanese investors about operational conditions in India. 
 
The paper is part of the series being brought out under ICRIER’s Japan Project, which is 
funded by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), Tokyo. It was presented at the seminar on 
“Japanese FDI in India: Experiences and Lesson” organised by ICRIER on March 18, 2009 
at New Delhi at which useful comments were received. We thank the SPF and the 
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Ever since India decided to globalize, concentrated effort was made to attract Japanese 
participation through foreign direct investment. However, response from Japan has been 
rather subdued. This paper attempts to gain some insight into this reluctance of Japanese 
investors by studying the experiences of eight firms which are either subsidiaries or joint 
ventures of Japanese companies. The companies that were studied are YKK, Honda Siel Pvt. 
Ltd, Sona Koyo Steering, Kyocera Wireless India Ltd, Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation PTA 
India (MCC PTA), Toyota Kirloskar Motor Ltd, Satake India Engineering Ltd and Eisai 
Pharmaceutical  Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Key findings of the study are as follows: Japanese companies are long term orientated with a 
strong commitment to ‘quality’ and ‘the customer’ and they try to fulfil this commitment by 
embedding the Japanese style of management into their operations. Among other factors, 
Japanese firms seek trust in their partner and each of the companies that have a joint venture 
in India spent a long time in deciding about the partnership. Labour unions are no longer 
viewed as a threat, as they have realized that a humane approach to labour guarantees 
harmony.  Skill gap at the lower end of the employee order is a concern and the response has 
been to participate in skill enhancement. In the telecommunications and pharmaceutical 
sectors, India has become a potential destination for R&D activity because of its cheap, 
knowledgeable and capable talent pool. Kyocera and Eisai have taken steps to take advantage 
of this opportunity. Though there are obstacles that continue to impede smooth operations, 
the Japanese firms that were studied have acquired a greater understanding of the Indian 
market, and the Government of India has also stimulated foreign direct investment through 
investor friendly policies, thus contributing to their success in Indian operations. The 
achievements of these firms show that many of the perceptions about investing and operating 
in India are unfounded and/or outdated. The success stories of these companies should help 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often used as an engine of growth by developing 
countries. For a developing country, it is the vehicle through which capital is provided and 
efficiency induced in the industrial sector. The firm in the country of origin is encouraged to 
invest in the developing country because of the lower resource costs, a growing market and 
restrictive import policies. Foreign direct investment is, therefore, an intertwining of interests 
of both the host and the home country. A firm that undertakes foreign direct investment gets 
involved in the purchase of an existing enterprise or facilities, establishing and managing 
new ones and/or participating in the management of an enterprise in a foreign country. It 
therefore requires the firm to conduct operations in the foreign country either through 
overseas subsidiaries or through joint ventures. Studies conducted so far have concentrated 
mainly on studying trends, patterns and location issues with respect to FDI, and therefore, 
have dwelt on the macro factors and policy orientations of both the host country as well as 
the country of origin. Though these dominate the movement of FDI into the host country, a 
neglected area of research, as pointed out by Meyer (2003), has been an analysis at the firm 
level of the conditions and externalities that help/deter the FDI flow. 
 
Until recently, Japanese foreign direct investment into India has been significantly lower 
when compared with FDI in other Asian countries. At the firm level, this means that a large 
number of companies have shied away from investing in India. One reason that is often 
quoted for this is that India is not perceived as a viable destination for investment by 
Japanese firms. This study is a modest attempt to understand how eight Japanese companies 
have entered India and have successfully carried out their operations. Some lessons may be 
drawn from their experiences, which in turn could help increase participation of Japanese 
foreign direct investment into India. Since only a small sample size has been used, this 
should be treated as exploratory research. 
 
In India, FDI operates through subsidiaries or joint ventures with Indian partners. At the firm 
level, FDI goes through three specific phases, and to understand the firm’s experience, each 
phase has to be scrutinised separately. The first phase is when a firm initiates the process of 
targeting the Indian market. There are various reasons for entry into a market - for a Japanese 
firm, it is primarily access to the local market and to expand it for its own product(s). One 
focus area of this study is to understand the entry strategy of Japanese firms, and especially, 
how they identify their Indian partners. 
 
The second phase is the period of establishment and commencement of operations. This 
usually lasts for one to five years. During this period, the manufacturing unit is constructed 
and commercial production is started. This period is the toughest, as firms have to contend 
with external obstacles as well as establish a fruitful relationship with their Indian partners. 
How the firms (that were studied) responded to and dealt with the obstacles can be held as 
examples for other Japanese companies seeking to test Indian shores. 
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The third phase covers the time beyond the first five years. During the first two phases, the 
firms have learnt lessons from their exposure to the host country. Having harnessed their 
understanding of the Indian market, they are now well established in their operations. It is in 
this period that they venture to expand their business. However, certain policies and obstacles 
continue to bother them. Understanding the ground realities could provide an insight into the 
problems being faced by the firms and help policy makers find solutions to them. 
 
The paper first gives a brief history and comparison of Japanese foreign direct investment 
into India and other Asian countries, highlighting the fact that Japanese investment into India 
is quite low. It then outlines the research objectives and explains the methodology followed. 
Second, the firm’s entry strategy is discussed to highlight how the Japanese view business 
partnerships. Third, attention is drawn to the obstacles faced by the firms which have been 
selected for the study and their responses to such obstacles. Finally, the key findings of the 
study are listed as lessons learnt and certain policy recommendations are suggested. 
 
2.  History of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment into India 
 
Japan’s participation in FDI in India is conditioned by Indian foreign investment policy as 
well as its industrial policy. A chronological study of Japan’s foreign direct investment into 
India can be divided into two phases - one, the post liberalisation phase-I, that is from 1991 
to 2000 and second, the post liberalisation phase-II, which is from 2000 till date. In the first 
phase, the Government of India had allowed a maximum of 49 per cent equity participation 
by foreign companies in a limited number of sectors. Over a period of time, the cap on equity 
participation by foreign companies as well as the sectors in which foreign companies could 
participate was increased. The division of the liberalisation phases is essentially linked to the 
direction taken by the Indian government towards equity participation by foreign companies 
and the opening up of different sectors in which foreign companies have been allowed to 
participate. 
 
India followed a restrictive foreign private investment policy until 1991, relying more on 
bilateral or multilateral loans with long-term maturity. The Foreign Exchange and Regulation 
Act (FERA), 1974, stipulated that foreign firms could have equity holdings only up to 40 per 
cent. The government could use its discretion to make exemptions.  The law also prohibited 
the use of foreign brands. However, one did see some hybrid domestic brands like Hero-
Honda operate in the Indian market. By the 1980s, some relaxation was made in the foreign 
investment policy, and this saw the setting up of Maruti, a central government joint venture 
with Suzuki Motors of Japan, in 1982. A crop of Japanese companies followed, who gained 
entry through technical collaborations or by getting exemptions. Sanyo and JVC used the 
technical collaboration route. 
 
2.1 The Post Liberalisation Phase-I 
 
In 1991, with the initiation of the industrial liberalisation policy, a significant change came 
about in the FDI climate. Foreign investment came to be regarded as supply of scarce capital, 
technology and managerial skills. India, having observed the development gains made by 
south-east Asian countries through foreign investments, benchmarked its own policies to help 
attract FDI. Over the decade, India permitted foreign investment in almost all sectors. 
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Table 1:  Japanese Investment in India 1991-2000 
 












Source: Government of India Statistics 
 
The cumulative FDI inflow received from Japan during the period 1991-1999 was US$2.6 
billion. This placed Japan in the fourth position among the countries which were investing in 
India. A closer look at the top ten investing countries in India (Table 2) shows that a fifth of 
the investment came from the US alone. Mauritius and the U.K. put together, made up almost 
another one fifth of the total investment. Thus, Japan with a 4 per cent share of the total FDI, 
had not taken advantage of the opening up of the Indian economy. 
 
Table 2:  Top Ten Investing Countries in India 1991-2000 
 
Rank  Country/ Region  % Share in FDI inflow 
1 US  20.4 
2 Mauritius  11.9 
3 UK  6.4 
4 Japan  4.0 
5 South  Korea  3.9 
6 Germany  3.4 
7 Australia  2.7 
8 Malaysia  2.3 
9 France  2.1 
10 Netherlands    1.9 
 
Source: Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics, 2001 
 
The importance of Japan and East Asia was realised during the first stage of the initiative of 
liberalising in India. Dr. Manmohan Singh, the then finance minister, launched India's ‘Look 
East’ policy in 1992 to seek out and develop economic ties with the members of ASEAN and 
major East Asian economies. The policy was a natural extension of the reform programme 
which aimed to open up the Indian economy and expand its participation in the global 
economy. There was also the hope that closer ties with the East Asian economies that had 
achieved enviably high growth rates would provide helpful insights for India. 
 
Unfortunately however, the ‘Look East’ policy did not capture Japan on its radar and failed 
to stimulate Japanese investment into India. Although in the beginning, there was a surge in 
Japanese companies arriving in India through joint ventures as shown in Table: 1, the flow 
did not gain momentum and actually hovered around US$300 million. The sectors that 
attracted Japanese investment were automobiles, telecommunications, fuel, chemicals and 4 
 
trading. Though the number of approvals steadily increased, the average investment was 
definitely low. The only silver lining was that the major approvals were technical 
collaborations (around 668 approvals), which meant that that Japanese companies were 
testing Indian business partners. 
 
Honda in the automobile sector and Sony in the electronics sector were the two important 
Japanese brands that made their entry in 1991. Taking advantage of the movement of the 
zipper industry from being a small scale industry to becoming a large scale industry, a 
company like YKK made its entry too. By the end of the decade, important brands like 
Toyota, Toshiba and Panasonic had also entered the Indian market. There was also a 
proliferation of companies in auto parts, fuels and chemical and industrial goods. 
 




Source: Government of India Statistics 
 
2.2 Comparison of Japanese FDI inflow into Asia and India in Phase-I 
 
Statistically, Japan was positioned fourth among the countries that invested in India. 
However, if one were to compare Japanese investment in India with that in the South East 
Asia region, one would find that India had attracted only 2 per cent of the Japanese 
investment flow into Asia in the first phase (Fig: 2) 
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Overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms in South East Asia and its neighbouring states were 
mainly in consumer durables manufacturing, industrial products and natural resources sector. 
In the 1980s, the Government of Japan had taken positive interest in developing this region 
with economic assistance. This had enticed Japanese FDI to this region, as among other 
reasons, labour here was cheap and disciplined. By the 1990s, this region was growing 
rapidly and providing greater opportunities. Moreover, the ease of operations due to Japan’s 
long associations with these countries had generated a certain level of comfort. India, with a 
diverse culture and complex socio-economic factors was a challenge to Japan. This was 
reinforced by varying legal provisions, policies and regulations in different parts of India. 
The labour situation in India was considered volatile. All this made Japan a reluctant 
investor. On India’s part, no image building exercise was carried out to project India as an 
industrial hub. 
 
2.3 The Post Liberalisation Phase-II 
 
In the second phase, 2000-2008, though there was a substantial increase in Japanese 
investment in 2002, it fell to a pathetic low of US$94.4 million in the year 2003 (see Figure 
3).There was some improvement between 2004 and 2006 though it was only in the last two 
years of this phase that there was a significant improvement to levels above US$600 million. 
It is estimated that by 2010, the investment will reach US$5.5 billion. 
 




Sources: Compiled from data of Department of Industrial Policy and Planning, Govt. of India, 
Monthly FDI fact sheet 2008. 
 
If one looks at the country-wise flow of FDI into India, then one finds that Japan has slipped 
from the fourth position in the previous decade to the sixth position in this decade. It is 
noticeable that even with more liberal policy changes; Japan’s percentage share has become 
3.27 per cent, while a country like Singapore, which did not figure as an investor in India in 
the last decade, has taken second position to Mauritius. This shows that whereas the “look 
east” policy of India did find takers in countries like Singapore, it did not impact the mind set 
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Table 3:  Top Ten Investing Countries in India 2000-2009 
 
Rank  Country  % Share in FDI inflow 
1 Mauritius  43.68 
2 Singapore  8.94 
3 U.S.A  7.67 
4 U.K.  5.58 
5 Netherlands  4.09 
6 Japan  3.27 
7 Cyprus    3.08 
8 Germany  2.60 
9 France  1.45 
10 U.A.E  1.15 
 
Source: Fact sheet on Foreign Direct investment (FDI) April 2000-July 2009, Department of 
Industrial Policy and Promotion 
 
The year 2000 saw a major policy change with foreign participation being allowed up to 100 
per cent in most sectors. Following this, the government rapidly relaxed conditions and 
enacted FEMA. In 2005, a significant change was brought about when foreign companies 
already operating in one sector were allowed to re-invest in another sector, through the 
automatic route. This permitted the foreign company to be treated as the equivalent of a 
domestic company, allowing it access to sectors that had so far been denied to it. 
 
All this should have encouraged Japanese companies, especially those in retail and finance - 
which are major players in Japanese outward FDI. However, one finds little presence of such 
Japanese companies in India. According to the current publication
1 (2008) of the Japanese 
embassy in India, there are 550 Japanese companies operating in India through joint 
ventures/subsidiaries. The sectors in which Japanese companies are operating have not 
changed much from the previous decade (Table: 4). Japanese companies have made their 
presence felt in the services sector but its share is only 3 per cent. In telecommunications, 
Japan has dropped from the second position to the fifth position in this decade. The latest 
figures are given below: 
 
Table 4:  Share of Top sectors Attracting FDI Inflow from Japan 2000 -2007 
 
Rank  Sector  % of FDI inflow  from Japan 
1 Automobile  industry  40.58 
2 Electrical  equipment  18.36 
3 Trading  6.82 
4 Services  sector  2.74 
5 Telecommunication  2.74 
 
Source: Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, India: A brief note on foreign collaboration 
with Japan. 
 
2.4 Comparison of Japanese FDI inflow into Asia and India in Phase-II 
 
A comparison between India and the countries in Asia which attract FDI from Japan shows 
India in an even poorer light until 2005. As Fig: 4 and Fig: 5 show, India did not find favour 
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with the Japanese investor. India lagged substantially behind China which was the most 
favoured destination for Japanese FDI. In 2005, India attracted only US $266 million of 
Japanese investment against the investment of US$6575 million in China. This was only 1.6 
per cent of Japan’s total FDI flow into Asia. 
 




Figure 5:  Comparison of Japanese FDI outflow into Asia, China and India 
 
Source: JETRO, Statistics: Japan Outward / Inward Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 
 
After 2005, however, the picture is quite different (Table: 5).India’s share in FDI flows from 
Japan has increased from 1 per cent in 2006 to 2 per cent in 2007 and to 4.2 per cent in 2008. 
It now ranks second among the Asian countries. The more popular destinations like 































Table 5:  Japan’s Outward FDI by Country/ Region 2007-2008 
 
Country  % share 2006  %  share 2007`  % share 2008 
China 12.3  8.5  5.0 
India 1.0  2.0  4.2 
Korea 3.0  1.8  1.8 
Thailand 4.0 3.5 1.5 
Hong Kong  3.0  1.5  1.0 
Vietnam 0.9  0.6  0.8 
Singapore 0.7  1.4  0.8 
Taiwan 1.0  1.9  0.8 
Indonesia 1.5  1.4 0.6 
Philippines 0.7  1.4  0.5 
Malaysia 5.9 0.4 0.5 
 
Source: JETRO, Statistics: Japan Outward / Inward Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 
 
Since Japanese firms are showing some interest in India for the first time, the focus of this 
study is to highlight the experiences of Japanese firms which have successfully operated in 
India. By doing so, some myths that shroud the Indian investment environment may be 
dispelled and participation of Japanese foreign direct investment may be encouraged. 
Further, it could also perhaps direct Indian policy makers to areas which need more attention. 
 
3.  Research Objectives and Methodology 
 
3.1  Objectives 
 
•  To examine the actual experiences of a select number of Japanese firms operating in 
India by themselves or with local partners and derive some understanding of: 
a.  The entry strategy of the firms 
b.  What needs to be done by policy makers to improve the investment climate, 
both at the central and state level 
c.  How to create a labour pool which is compatible with the requirements of 
Japanese firms. 
•  To dispel reservations in the minds of Japanese investors about operational conditions 
in India. 
 
To achieve these objectives, the study undertook a survey of eight Japanese companies at 
various stages of operation, gathered information and inferred lessons from their experiences. 
The companies were selected on the basis of their sector of operation and the background of 
the Japanese partner
2. An objective location distribution was also considered to provide a 
better spectrum for analysis. To incorporate the new sectors that have opened up for FDI 
after 2000, two out of the eight companies chosen are from the pharmaceutical and 
telecommunications industries. Since only eight companies have been surveyed, the findings 
will inherently be limited. However, since the companies are representative of the major 
sectors of Japanese investment, the findings should be helpful in giving some direction to 
Japanese investors. 
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Table 6:  Profiles of the Selected Firms 
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3.2  Methodology 
 
The study was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire
3 circulated to the organisations 
concerned, prior to the setting up of interviews with key personnel. The questionnaire used 
open-ended questions since the main objective was to get the opinion of the respondents. 
Before the visit, some guidelines were drawn up to provide direction to the interviews with 
select managers, of whom at least one was Japanese. Since the top management of these 
companies was the target group, the interviews were conducted in a conversational manner in 
order to gather more information. A recording facility was used wherever permitted. In most 
of the companies, a plant visit was also arranged. The companies sent the completed 
questionnaires through electronic mail, at a later date. 
 
4.  Entry Strategy of Japanese Firms into India 
 
As India emerged as a market with a strong potential for growth, some Japanese companies 
took the initiative to invest in India. For most investing companies, competitors had already 
set foot in India. Moreover, the central and state government policies were encouraging 
enough to make India a natural choice for them. 
 
However, among the firms studied, Toyota Kirloskar Motors (TKM), Satake and Koyo had 
come to India in the past and tested Indian waters but their experiences had not been 
rewarding. Toyota had partnered a joint venture with DCM to build light commercial 
vehicles branded ‘DCM Toyota’. They found the outing very tiring, as DCM’s approach to 
the partnership was very high-handed. This resulted in a lot of friction. Thus, when DCM 
decided to tie up with Daewoo, Toyota called off the partnership. Koyo had a joint venture 
partnership with a state unit in Andhra Pradesh and incurred huge losses due to operational 
inefficiencies and bureaucratic indifference. Satake, too, had a poor experience in India. To 
test the Indian market, it had sent 25 units of rice processing mill machinery in knocked-
down form to the Government of India under open bidding. Of the 25 units shipped through a 
shipping agency of Indian origin, only 12 units were supplied. The others went unaccounted. 
Furthermore, in a year’s time, a product of an inferior quality with the same name as that 
used by Satake to market its product hit the Indian market. Satake reacted by turning away 
from the Indian market. When India opened its doors to FDI investment in 1991, these 
companies stayed away because their past experiences had made them hesitant and 
apprehensive about the possibility of sustained operations in India. It is the operations of 
their competitors and their success stories which prompted these companies to come to India 
at a later date. 
 
As a step to enter India, each of these firms conducted detailed feasibility surveys. Most of 
them used McKinsey or Ernest & Young for evaluation of some parameters. Satake was the 
only company that had used the Japanese trading company Marubeni and Mitsubishi. The 
locations identified by the survey teams considered factors such as proximity to a national 
highway, port or airport, as the need might be, as well as the available infrastructure – from 
land to telephone connectivity, water supply, internal roads, sewage system, tax holidays, 
specific requirements and availability of low cost labour as well as skilled manpower. For the 
automobile and chemical companies, the promises made by the state governments also 
played a crucial role. 
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Companies like Honda and Toyota took the route of using joint ventures with Indian business 
houses to operate in India. They spent considerable time in identifying compatible business 
partners. Compatibility was sought not only in the financial capacity of the partners but also 
in their philosophy towards business, their attitude towards work and their interest in Japan 
and Japanese management. Further, the individual personality of the Indian partner also 
played a role in the signing of the joint venture document. They then used their partners to 
establish links with the bureaucracy and state political outfits. 
 
MCC and Eisai followed a more conventional entry strategy. MCC started to export PTA 
into India from 1993 and Eisai got into a licensing agreement with Glaxo Smith Kline and 
Unichem for the sale of two of its most popular drugs. It was considered too risky to set up a 
distribution channel for a drug that would be sold as an over the counter drug by chemists. 
By resorting to this option, both companies feel that they profited by understanding both the 
market and the nuances of administrative issues, albeit indirectly. 
 
Despite having other options for locations, Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation’s decision to 
locate in West Bengal has always intrigued observers, since the state has a communist 
government – a factor that is perceived as a deterrent to attracting FDI. It is for this very 
reason that it was chosen for the study. The various project teams from Mitsubishi Chemical 
Corporation (MCC), which visited India during 1994-96, essentially looked at coastal states, 
which had port facilities. In Haldia, they found Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited 
(HPCL), an Indian public sector company, already in a similar field of operation. They also 
found that George Soros held some shares of HPCL. Moreover, Haldia was close to their 
Thailand operation. Besides, the proximity of West Bengal to the textile industry in Eastern 
India and Bangladesh was an important consideration. Since its major competitors were 
based in western India, MCC felt that an operation in the east would help them gain the 
markets in the north and north-east as well. The lush green environment with large water 
bodies in Haldia was an added attraction. All these factors played a role in finalising Haldia 
as a preferred location. 
 
The clinching point was the keen interest shown by the Government of West Bengal in 
attracting MCC. During negotiations with the government, MCC found them to be cordial, 
sympathetic to MCC’s needs and eager to provide external support to make the Japanese 
giant’s Indian operations a success. Indeed, the issue of labour was a major concern, but the 
Government of West Bengal repeatedly assured MCC that it would extend all possible help 
to establish congenial labour relations. It was the state Communist government’s strong cadre 
base in Haldia that boosted MCC’s confidence in setting up base in Haldia since it was felt 
that this provided it some insurance against sabotage or opposition from the local population. 
MCC PTA India decided to have the West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation 
among its minor shareholders with a 5 per cent stake. Through this strategy, it was assumed 
that MCC PTA India would be able to iron out  operational bottlenecks with respect to 
dedicated oil pipelines and human resources. 
 
All the manufacturing companies under study chose greenfield areas for their operations in 
India because this gave them certain advantages. First, since all of them were major 
investors, the respective state governments were more cordial to their demands, giving them 
the advantage in negotiations. Second, greenfield areas have the advantage of raw talent, 
which helped the firms promote the Japanese method of management. Third, all of them 
positioned themselves in locations earmarked for industrial development or special economic 
zones, which helped them to take advantage of taxation and land utilisation policies. 12 
 
While business considerations were the primary factors in the choice of location, the local 
climate also played a part in some cases. Toyota, for instance, had a choice between Chennai 
and Bangalore; it was the climate of Bangalore that tilted the decision in its favour. Besides, 
many companies also factored in expatriate lifestyles to select their locations. 
 
From the above discussion, one can conclude that Japanese companies have entered India 
after a thorough investigation for which they have taken the help of renowned consultant 
companies. While some companies have used the strategy of exporting to India before 
starting a business operation, others have chosen the option of joint ventures. Once the Indian 
government allowed wholly-owned subsidiaries, few others used these means. Strategically, 
all of them located themselves in greenfield areas to take advantage of the facilities. Further, 
they believed that by locating their companies in greenfield areas, they could promote the 
philosophy of Japanese management into their operations. 
 
5.  Obstacles Faced and Responses 
 
The obstacles faced by the companies in their operations are not very different from those 
often listed in the literature on this subject.  The concern in this study was to see and 
understand how these companies responded to these obstacles. For this, the companies were 
asked to rank the following obstacles (question no. 12 in the questionnaire) – the central 
government, state governments, local authorities, human resources, legal framework, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, land acquisition procedures and obtaining approvals – in 
order of the highest to the lowest, in terms of their perception of the obstacle (a rank of 1 
being the highest and 10 being the lowest). This helped understand each company’s 
perception of these obstacles. During the interactions, each obstacle was discussed and 
inferences were drawn.  This section highlights how the eight companies perceived the 
obstacles and tackled them. 
 
5.1 Infrastructure, Institutional Hurdles, Regulations and Legal 
 
5.1.1 Land Acquisition 
 
The process of acquiring land continues to be extremely complicated and is not a transparent 
process in India. Japanese companies, while deciding upon location, do place a premium on 
the issue of acquiring land. The companies under study had all located themselves in green 
field areas and in locations earmarked for industrial development to minimise land 
acquisition problems. 
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Of the eight companies, the five companies that ranked it as high as number one or number 
two were manufacturing companies. The automobile sector that required a large area for its 
operation was obviously the most affected. Kyocera and Satake did not have any issues 
simply because Kyocera operated from a technology park and Satake was a marketing unit 
that did not require a large tract of land. 
 
State governments, in consultation with the company usually allocate a plot of the required 
size. While arriving at a decision about the location of the plant, the foreign company 
employs a real estate agent or a law firm or depends on their joint venture partner to help 
identify a plot keeping in mind the approach road, water and power requirements and any 
other specific needs that may be essential for its operations. Once the plot is identified, the 
unwieldy process of paper work begins. The papers have to go through various government 
departments to get the requisite approvals. Once these formalities are taken care of, the land 
deed is signed. All this takes considerable time and is conditioned by state laws. In addition, 
in greenfield areas, if the land identified happens to be agricultural land, then converting it 
into an industrial plot is a cumbersome process.  Often there are controversies about the 
rightful owner since many claimants do not possess the land deed. In addition to this, some of 
the companies had to fight against the illegal possession of land given to them. For instance, 
Honda faced the problem of a temple in one corner of the plot of land allocated to them. 
When they started building the plant, they continued to pursue the local government to get 
the land evacuated. However, they soon realised that this would create a bad image and could 
become an issue with the local community. So they relinquished the area possessed by the 
temple authority. 
 
Honda and YKK have had many years of operation in India and they still ranked this obstacle 
as number one. Both of them had established themselves in the first phase of the opening up 
of the Indian economy, had played safe, and acquired as much land as was necessary for its 
project. However, when they went in for expansion in 2006-07, they had to go through the 
same exercise again. Honda’s identified location was Tarapur in Rajasthan.  But this time, 
Honda’s experience was relatively better because the State of Rajasthan had in the meantime, 
made amendments and created systems that were more transparent and agreeable. YKK, on 
the other hand, faced many administrative bottlenecks while setting up its plant in Rewari 
district.  The respondent felt that YKK operates in the zipper industry that is governed by a 
far greater number of compliance requirements as compared to other industries and the 
problem could have arisen from this factor. 
 
TKM and MCC PTA India were companies that came in after 1995. They had gathered some 
understanding from the experiences of other Japanese firms. Wisely and at the very outset, 
they acquired large tracts of land to provide for future expansion operations. They were able 




The issue of infrastructure is two-faceted. One is the conventional infrastructure of roads, 
ports, airports, power and water. The other is the soft infrastructure – telecommunications, 
internet facilities, connectivity, etc. 
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Figure 7:  Perceptions of Companies: Underdeveloped Infrastructure as an Obstacle 
 
   
 
Infrastructure as an obstacle is a major concern among FDI players. However, in this study, 
only MCC PTA India ranked infrastructure as the most important bottleneck. The companies 
Satake, Kyocera, Sona Steering Power and YKK did not consider infrastructure to be an 
obstacle and ranked it at number six and seven. It is interesting to note that Sona Steering and 
YKK, both operating in the state of Haryana, did not find infrastructure a problem. 
Questioning revealed that this was because some of the infrastructural obstacles had been 
taken care of by in-house arrangements. Besides, the road network was relatively better 
developed in the state. 
 
Among the infrastructural obstacles, power and water were rated as vital. Power  is an 
essential requirement for operations and when land is acquired, promises are made about 
uninterrupted power and water supply. However, in reality, uninterrupted power supply is a 
major impediment. Similarly, often uninterrupted flow of water is a rarity as pipelines and 
water connectivity is poor in green field locations. All this added to the overall cost to the 
company. 
 
Roadways, seaways and airways are yet another important infrastructural requirement. MCC 
PTA India has been hard hit on the infrastructure front. As a chemical unit, it requires 
efficient movement of goods by port as well as by road. This unfortunately has been 
hampered at their location. The arterial road leading to the Haldia plant is yet to meet the 
specifications of a standard highway road. Attempts have been made to improve the 
condition of the roads, but the project has been marred by disputes and one noticed 
incomplete work along the drive to the plant. The port also faces a problem of silting and 
requires regular dredging which, however, is not done. With respect to roads, ports and 
airports, the companies are in no position to take independent initiatives and can only draw 
attention to these issues at various forums. 
 
For a company like Kyocera, because of the sector in which it operates, soft infrastructure 
was a major problem. Irregular connectivity and the slow speed of the internet service often 
came in the way of dealing efficiently with their clients. While they were happy with the way 
the government has responded to the industry demand, their only submission was that the 




Obtaining compliance for manufacturing units continues to cause inconvenience to the 
Japanese companies. Often, Indian policies have contradictions or there is administrative 
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Figure 8:  Perceptions of Companies: Obtaining Approvals as an Obstacle 
 
 
The process of obtaining approvals continues to be one of the major obstacles faced by the 
companies. The survey showed that six companies gave “obtaining approvals as obstacles”, a 
rank of one or three.  One reason is the lack of co-ordination between various departments. 
As TKM pointed out, approvals are often given and subsequently withdrawn, causing a lot of 
avoidable confusion and delay. Moreover, the problems faced have more to do with the 
overbearingly bureaucratic attitude of the agents handling various approvals. Often, officials 
are unaware of the changes in requirements and are rarely proactive. This results in delays 
and causes setbacks in project deadlines or production targets. Interestingly, when the 
companies were asked whether there was an improvement in the way approvals are being 
handled as compared to the manner in which it was done during the 1990s, there was near-





Figure 9:  Perceptions of Companies: Central Government, State Government and 
Local Government as an Obstacle 
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The companies felt that regulatory and procedural obstacles existed in all three tiers of 
governance. However, the cause of dissatisfaction varied. A major issue between the 
companies and the centre was taxation and custom duties. Apart from finding the tax system 
complicated, prompt disclosure and explanations about changes brought about in custom 
duties and taxation was found wanting. For Kyocera, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India posed problems because of procedural delays and repeated queries. 
 
For all companies, the state government was the main approving authority. Bureaucratic red 
tape and consequent delays that resulted was one major issue. Though, a single window 
system has come into being, over time, often the implementing agents have little knowledge 
and cause delays .Honda Siel, and Toyota have ranked it seventh and they attribute this to 
their liaisoning capability with the state bureaucracy. 
 
At the local level, where companies have to deal with authorities on a day-to-day basis, the 
main complaint was that there was a lack of transparency in the guidelines for approvals, 
leaving room for subjective interpretation by the person handling it at a particular point in 
time. This, companies felt, resulted in avoidable scrutiny of papers on irrelevant issues. A 
local authority as an obstacle was ranked fifth by Honda Siel, Sona Steering, MCC PTA, 
Kyocera and Eisai. 
 
During the discussions, specific reference was made to a few obstacles that were not 
categorised separately in the list of obstacles in the questionnaire. Since they surfaced during 
discussions with all the companies, they have been discussed below. 
 
5.1.3b Taxation and Subsidies 
 
Indian taxation is complex and thus difficult to understand. Many components of taxation 
change every year, and this is not immediately notified through proper channels. 
Supplementary taxes like education cess, 5 per cent R&D cess on technology transfer, IT 
software duty of 8.24 per cent etc. add to operating costs, for which no justification is found. 
 
As for custom duties, the system is complicated by additional duties and countervailing 
duties. The process of getting refunds for special additional duty is cumbersome and often 
the cost incurred is more than the amount to be refunded, rendering the concept of refund 
meaningless. The corporate tax policy of differentiating between domestic companies (30 per 
cent) and foreign companies (40 per cent) is viewed as being discriminatory. Customs 
clearance is complicated because of certain procedures that have to be followed.  For 
instance, there is a stipulation that the invoice of goods has to be registered twenty-four hours 
in advance of the arrival of goods. In case of emergencies, this is difficult, especially if the 
customs office is located at a distance. This clause causes additional problems when there is a 
contingency and urgent movement of goods is required between a plant located in an Asian 
country and the plant based in India. Due to the proximity of the dispatching plant, it is well 
impossible to meet the twenty-four hour registration requirement, as often the goods arrive 
before the twenty-four hour condition is fulfilled. 
 
Satake felt that the subsidy given by the Indian government for buying post-harvest 
equipment to facilitate better yield can not be put to good use by the consumers of their 
product because of administrative bottlenecks. The subsidies given for purchasing of 
equipments is often given to those who have political clouts within the administration. 17 
 
Further, the delays caused in sanctioning and disbursing the amount caused hardship. These 
were some of the major grievances against the centre. 
 
5.1.3c Procedural Delays 
 
By and large, the major complaint is that the decisions announced by the authorities are not 
acted upon with speed and clarity. As many initiatives are not announced through proper 
channels, the implementing agency often refuses to act. Bureaucratic delays invariably 
inhibit effective communication, and it rests on the companies to deal with technical issues 
that are, again, subject to interpretation. 
 
5.1.3d Political Instability 
 
The frequency with which political leadership changes at the centre and states are of concern 
but what causes greater concern is the way the administrative machinery always slows down 
before elections. It is also known that many policies are reversed when a different political 
party is elected to run the government. Given these uncertainties, the companies find it 








In matters of the law and legal issues, India more or less follows western practice and this is 
perceived as an advantage by the companies. However, problems arise because there are far 
too many laws that are subjected to varying interpretations. The two courts that these 
companies have to face are the civil court and the labour court. Apart from the fact that 
hearings in these courts tend to take a long time to complete, cases often move up to the High 
Court and the Supreme Court where the verdict may vary. 
 
The politicisation of the legal system also adds to the problems faced by these companies.  
There is no indication that a longer stay in India has reduced this perception because Honda 
gives this obstacle the fourth rank. Sona Steering and Kyocera ranked legal obstacles as the 
second most important obstacle. However, the factors that lead to this perception are 
different in the two cases. Sona Steering considers labour commissions and labour courts as 
rigid with case settlements pending for several years. This creates additional pressure on the 
company. Kyocera on the other hand, considered legality from the point of view of the 













The companies surveyed have the advantage of being large and thus had the resources to 
overcome the obstacles faced. Because of their stature, they could also absorb the costs 
incurred due to project delays caused by these obstacles. Their resilient approach along with 
certain individual strategies has helped them succeed in India. This section throws some light 
on how the companies dealt with the problems of infrastructure, regulations and institutional 
hurdles. 
 
The companies that have Indian partners in joint ventures rely on their partners to take care 
of regulatory and legal obstacles. They have wisely divided the operational responsibilities 
between the Japanese and Indian partners in the following manner: the Japanese partner 
concentrates on production, technical know-how and management of the plant while the 
Indian partner is responsible for liaisoning with the local, state and central government 
authorities, procurement, developing the goodwill of the local community, and industrial 
relations. 
 
Companies operating as subsidiaries have similarly divided responsibilities, with the Indian 
managers handling administrators, bureaucrats and the media. The more recent entrants like 
Satake, Kyocera and Eisai have appointed Indians at the helm of their affairs. Satake markets 
rice mill machinery and their business dealings are in the rural sector. The decision to place 
an Indian at the top was made on the recommendation of Japanese expatriates, who felt that 
during business deals, an Indian was better equipped to understand the nuances of local 
business culture. In Kyocera and Eisai, the preference for an Indian managing director was 
because the business required interacting with knowledge workers. In addition, most of these 
companies have dedicated personnel whose job is to take care of issues at the ground level. 
 
To overcome the lack of infrastructural facilities in developing countries, Japan had been 
following a two-pronged strategy of investing in a country while giving Overseas 
Development Assistance, in the form of tied-aid. In the first phase of the opening up of the 
economy for FDI, some Japanese Overseas Development Assistance had been disbursed to 
India as tied-aid. For example, in the period 1996-1997, a bridge was built to connect Delhi 
to the Noida export processing zone to facilitate movement of both men and material. This 
bridge (Nizamuddin Bridge) was built with the help of Japanese technology and the 
participation of Japanese construction firms because there were a sizable number of Japanese 
companies operating in the Noida export zone. However, as tied-aid is frowned upon by the 
Indian government, such deals have no longer taken place. 
 
Currently, the companies handle the infrastructural deficiencies in a different way. They 
accept whatever is available and then use their resources to fill the gaps. Consistent power 
supply as an infrastructural input is not taken for granted in India; these companies have 
therefore, chosen to generate power on their own at their operational locations. Water is 
privately sourced in case there is a need. Companies like TKM are unhappy that they have 
not been able to resolve water issues by digging wells within their premises. This is because 
of a blanket ban on digging wells as a result of the sharp depletion of ground water resources 
in the country. According to the plant officials interviewed, depletion of the ground water 
table was not an issue where their plants are located and they could have been given sanction 
by the local authorities had the local authority evaluated and performed the necessary tests 
required for establishing ground water level. Often, a blanket policy decision, rather than a 
case-by-case approach taken by the local authorities hinders operations in India. 19 
 
To handle legal obstacles, companies have legal consultants who are consulted on a regular 
basis, especially before striking any deal. Before signing a vendor/dealer partnership, they 
follow a rigorous process of scrutiny and document all commitments made by either party to 
ensure a hassle-free relationship. Often, well-known consultant companies are engaged to do 
independent studies of the feasibility of a project or on other concerns of the organisation so 




Understanding the Indian market has been one of the most difficult tasks for the companies. 
As one of the interviewees remarked, “It is misleading to think that as India is an Asian 
country, we know India well.” Some companies faced problems when they initially launched 
their products. Honda for instance, had through a survey in the auto expo held in Delhi in 
1996, zeroed in on red as the most popular colour among car consumers. However, when 
they launched their car, white turned out to be the most popular colour. Such stories are in 
abundance among the Japanese business community. 
 
Specific to Eisai, Kyocera, Satake and Sona Steering is the proliferation of a large number of 
duplicate products of low price and poor quality in the market. These companies feel that 
Indian consumers are price sensitive and look for cheap products. The companies on the 
other hand are conscious of the quality of their products and thus cannot compromise with it 




As mentioned in the previous section, Honda, having faltered in their assessment of Indian 
colour preferences had even gone to the extent of consulting designer Ritu Beri for advice. 
Toyota was able to avoid a similar experience by an in-house consumer survey as a result of 
which they were able to identify the niche market segment for SUVs and launch ‘Innova’ 
successfully. In fact, their marketing strategy has been applauded for its correct assessment 
of the Indian consumer. Japanese investment forums
4 have impressed upon Japanese 
companies seeking a share of the Indian market, the importance of making use of market 
surveys conducted by reputed market research agencies to understand consumer behaviour in 
India. 
 
Companies facing competition from spurious products have responded by keeping vigil on 
the market. They are constantly at work to detect such activity and try and take legal action 
against manufacturers of counterfeit products. However, the interviewees admitted that while 
this is both costly and time consuming, it often did not bear fruit. 
 
5.3 Human Resource 
 
There has been a perception that the quality of human resource and existing labour laws has 
been important factors that have deterred many Japanese firms from investing in India. 
                                                 
4  Japan External Trade  Organisation,  Mitsubishi General Trading Cooperation 20 
 
 
Figure 11:  Perceptions of Companies: Human Resource as an Obstacle 
 



























Most Japanese firms think that India has a smart and intelligent workforce but also feel that it 
is casual, lacks discipline and is argumentative. It is also felt that controlling them and 
getting work out of them is difficult. Therefore, it was surprising that four companies gave it 
the eighth rank. Eisai and Kyocera gave this obstacle the eighth rank essentially because both 
of them deal with knowledge workers who are better skilled. Sona Steering, which also gave 
it the eighth rank, explained that, though it has a joint venture today,
5 the management has 
been Indian and the leadership of the chairman had given importance to responsive labour-
management relations. MCC PTA India, which ranked human resource as an obstacle at 
position eight, clarified that by involving all level of employees in the decision-making 
process of the company, a favourable environment is created. Further, from time to time, the 
local political parties are appraised about the happenings in the plant. On the other hand, 
TKM considered human resource as the most important obstacle and ranked it at number 
one. The reason however, was not tied to the labour unrest that it had faced intermittently 
from the time it started its operations; rather the company felt that the right skill sets and 
progressive attitude was what was missing in the available human resource. In addition, both 
TKM and YKK felt that it took a long time to groom manpower to operate efficiently. 
 
The interactions revealed that most of the manpower problems the companies faced were 
directly related to the sectors in which they operate. Thus, the companies in automobiles, 
auto components and processing sectors had similar issues. The pharmaceutical company and 
the IT infrastructure firm had different problems to contend with. Satake, a marketing 
company, had issues quite similar to those of the IT sector. Thus, for convenience, in the 
following section that discusses labour problems the automobile companies, auto component 
companies and the processing company have been clubbed under the manufacturing sector. 
The pharmaceutical company, the rice mill machinery company and the IT company have 
been dealt with separately. 
 
5.3.1 Labour in the Manufacturing Sector 
 
This sector has two types of labour – shop-floor workers who form the majority of the 
workforce and managerial workers. Both groups have distinct sets of issues that need to be 
understood in order to comprehend the reasons for confrontation between the employees 
from Japan and those from India. 
                                                 
5 Sona Steering moved from technical collaboration with Koyo to a joint venture with them. For more details, 
look up Appendix II. 21 
 
Shop-floor workers are recruited at the entry level from the ITIs.
6 During the start-up period, 
supervisors with some industry experience are recruited in order to meet the large manpower 
requirement. All the companies however, have also intentionally kept the level of experience 
below five years to avoid the rigidity of attitude that is often seen among more experienced 
workers. Perhaps because of this, the skill set of this group has been found wanting and is 
way below the expectation of the companies. Concern about attrition was absent till around 
the year 2000 but has slowly surfaced since then. 
 
5.3.2 Labour and Unions 
 
During the initial days, labour unions were looked upon with suspicion. Thus early entrants 
like Honda Siel took precautions like avoiding local recruitments, not allowing relatives to 
work in the company and discouraging union formation. Once workers imbibed the Honda 
way of life through various training programmes and showed maturity and an understanding 
of being result-oriented, Honda encouraged them to form an in-house union. The union was 
given information about the company’s long-term goals and was encouraged to help define 
and promote them among the workers. Over time, this cordial relationship has been enhanced 
by the management to allow deserving shop-floor level supervisors to move up to managerial 
posts. 
 
MCC PTA India, YKK and Sona Steering also have in-house unions and encourage open 
dialogue between the workers and management. Following the principle of “consensus 
decision-making”, these companies have many platforms through which workers participate 
and involve themselves in company affairs. A suggestion system, quality circles, weekly 
meetings and mentoring are used concurrently, resulting in an egalitarian environment within 
the organisations and cordial industrial relations. 
 
TKM, however, has faced union problems ever since its operations began in India. As early 
as in 2001, it faced two strikes. Then, in 2002, a strike was followed by a 53-day lock-out. 
The major issue was shift-duty timings. TKM worked in two shifts: one shift from 8 a.m. to 4 
p.m. and another shift from 8 p.m. up to 4 a.m. As the demand increased, the four-hour gap 
between the two shifts was utilised as overtime. This was not approved of by the workers and 
it led to a strike and lock-out. During the conciliatory meeting, TKM not only changed its 
shift timings but also hiked the salaries of the workers. However, confrontations with the 
CITU-affiliated union continued. The company did not favour the union’s political 
association and showed its displeasure. It did not give in to the demand of the union for a 
separate office within the factory premises. These early confrontation with the labour union 
did not lead to much change in the approach towards dealing with labour. 
 
The next major incident happened in January 2006. TKM management had dismissed three 
workers and suspended ten employees as they were found guilty of misconduct, which 
included an assault on the supervisors, violent behaviour and disruption of work. The 
employees’ union went on a snap strike demanding that TKM reinstate three dismissed 
employees, ten suspended employees and improve the working conditions at the plant. The 
TKM management thought it best to declare an indefinite lock-out as the workers were 
getting unruly. What followed were three rounds of conciliatory talks between the union, the 
company and the labour commissioner. The company stood firm about not reinstating the 
                                                 
6 ITIs are vocational technical training institutes which train students to handle industrial equipments and earn a 
diploma in engineering. 22 
 
dismissed workers, while the union refused to talk before the dismissed workers were taken 
back. The labour commission’s proposal of lifting the lock-out, calling off the strike and 
keeping the issue of dismissal order in abeyance did not get approval either from the 
management or the union. Sensing an impasse, the matter was placed in the Karnataka High 
Court. Legally speaking, this ensured that the workers could not be on strike as the matter 
had been placed before the court. The strike was declared as illegal. It is believed that TKM 
was coached to move the negotiation in this direction by the concerned authorities. 
 
In the meantime, anxious about the negative image that the state was getting internationally, 
Karnataka’s industries minister, along with the labour minister, stepped in to talk to both 
parties. TKM was advised by the ministry of industry to resume operations and was promised 
help in case of violence. TKM resumed operations after nearly sixteen days of deadlock 
under heavy security arrangements. In an advertisement published in a local newspaper, 
TKM declared the plant open and stated its position that it was a proactive step taken by the 
company at the behest of their loyal employees and their families. However, the employees 
were required to sign a ‘good conduct undertaking’. 
 
Since then, there has been a significant change in the company’s approach towards labour. 
Japanese managers have taken over the management of labour. While discussing this issue, 
the Japanese managers acknowledged that they had relied on their Indian counterparts who 
had a strong sense of hierarchy and had driven the management-labour relations on the 
principle of the “iron fist”. This, the Japanese realised, had created a rift and brought about a 
confrontationist response from the workers. 
 
Today, the company’s human resource policy has strong humanitarian concerns and it is 
implemented through an open-door policy which is encouraged among Japanese expatriates. 
The Japanese HR managers confirmed that one-to-one communication between supervisors, 
production managers and workers is encouraged and this has helped in both understanding 
problems faced by the workers and finding solutions to labour issues. This had not been easy 
because gaining the trust of the workers was the most difficult task. But with a strong 
commitment towards an egalitarian environment, TKM has put together many training 
programmes where the participants are a mix of managers and senior workers, thus breaking 
hierarchical barriers. 
 
5.3.3  Managers in the Manufacturing Sector 
 
The Indian managers in this sector come from two kinds of backgrounds. One section 
consists of engineers or engineers with management degrees who are absorbed in production 
and marketing. The other consists of managers from different backgrounds but with 
management degrees; they look after human resource management, procurement and public 
relations. Unlike the labour pool where skill-sets are often found wanting, these managers are 
smart and knowledgeable with a strong capacity to deliver. However, a major issue of 
contention was their rigid approach to work and consequently, their difficulty in imbibing the 
Japanese work culture. Further, they often approached problems with less focus and expected 
problems to sort themselves out. Some of them were individualistic, competitive and also had 
an attitude of superiority. Staff at the junior level was found to have a very short-term 
perspective and was prone to high attrition. 
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5.3.4 Workforce and Eisai (Pharmaceutical) 
 
The only company that was studied in the pharmaceutical sector is Eisai as, at present, this is 
the only Japanese company in this sector that is operating in India as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. Sharing their experience is important, as this sector has a future in India and one 
expects more FDI participation from Japan. Since Eisai has yet to start operating its plant, 
they have so far recruited manpower only for their sales operations. This search for recruits 
in sales has exposed personnel from the head quarters in Japan to the talent pool available in 
India. Their main targets were the universities offering a Bachelor’s degree in Pharmacology 
and experienced persons from this sector. As far as the skill specifications of the organisation 
are concerned, Eisai found their expectations were well-matched and the cost of employment 
in India less when compared to the cost in other subsidiaries. 
 
5.3.5 Workforce and Satake (Rice Mill Machinery) 
 
Satake India, being a marketing and customer servicing company, faces a major problem in 
finding suitable talent for its operations. The company ideally requires a skill-set of at least a 
Master’s in agricultural engineering. Unfortunately, Indian agricultural institutes are not 
geared to meet their requirement, since their curriculum and even the machines they use for 
training are quite obsolete. Thus, the company is constantly seeking out students from other 
engineering streams and retraining them to suit the needs of the company. 
 
5.3.6 Workforce and Kyocera (Mobile System) 
 
Kyocera is the only company that was studied in this sector. The talent pool for this sector 
has a Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees in information technology. With the Indian government 
allowing private institutes to offer these courses, there is no skill shortage. However, 
managers of Kyocera were concerned that while the knowledge level of the talent pool was 
very high, they were not application oriented and thus took longer to become fully efficient. 
In addition, this sector faced a high attrition rate, which not only added to cost but also made 




All the companies follow the practice of apprenticeship/management trainees before 
inducting employees in permanent roles. In the large manufacturing sector, this helps 
companies to get labour at a low cost and gives the organisations additional scope to evaluate 
individual attitudes and compatibility. In the IT sector, this becomes an alternative to full 
employment and helps the organisations develop firm-specific talent. All this is 
supplemented by dedicated campus recruitment. The interactions revealed a lot of 
commonality in the skill-set issue and the approach of the companies to solve this. 
 
Honda Siel, Sona Steering and YKK have adopted ITIs to help bridge the skill gap. Not only 
have they encouraged the ITIs to upgrade their curriculum but have also supported them with 
new equipment for training and provided additional faculty from their own managerial pools 
to help build human resource capability. 
 
TKM’s answer to the skill gap was to open a training institute within the factory premises. 
This training institute is on the lines of an ITI. The duration of the course is three years of 
which one year is in the factory. An applicant to this course is required to have graduated the 24 
 
10th standard with 60 per cent marks and must be below 18 years of age. Each batch has a 
capacity of 64 seats. Apart from technical papers, the course also educates students on 
economics, politics and housekeeping skills. Two languages – English and Japanese – are 
also taught. A stipend of Rs.1800 is given to all students and a fellowship of Rs.7000 is given 
to students who score over 70 per cent and have also acquired stars for good attitude and 
behaviour. The students are evaluated throughout the day on attitude and behaviour, right 
from how the bed is made to personal neatness and cleanliness. A student’s discipline in class 
and outside and his eye for continuous improvement are also taken into account. All this 
helps the student to build character, which is what is desired by TKM. Through this 
programme, TKM hopes to create disciplined, committed and quality-conscious employees 
who would prove to be highly efficient at the workplace. This programme of TKM is also 
seen as an answer to the union problems that they had faced intermittently. 
 
The TKM experiment is of larger interest to the industry. When a student graduates from this 
training institute, in addition to an up-gradation of his skill set, the “Toyota Way” has been 
inculcated in him. Such a student would prove more productive in any firm, particularly 
those with a Japanese partnership. 
 
The discussion on the obstacles faced and the ways in which the firms responded firmly 
points out that many of them had reacted in a similar manner. However, for some of the 
obstacles, some companies differed in their response because of their circumstances. Lessons 
that can be drawn from their experiences are dealt with, in the following section. 
 
6.  Lessons Learnt 
 
India has become increasingly important to the Japanese firms that had established 
themselves in the country in the 1990s. A little over a decade-long stay in India has given 
them the confidence to operate in the local environment. All of them have therefore 
strategically gone for expansion by setting up a second plant. The journey for them has been 
a learning experience, as India is very different from any other Asian country. The new 
entrants, Eisai (pharmaceuticals) and Kyocera (mobile systems), also have big plans for 
India. Both Eisai and Kyocera realise that the sectors in which they operate offer great 
market potential. The easy availability of an inexpensive workforce only adds to India’s 
attractiveness. 
The experiences of the Japanese companies under study give directions to three stakeholders 
who can draw lessons from it. They are: the Japanese business houses interested in India, the 
Indian business houses interested in Japanese collaborations and the Indian government. 
 
6.1  Japanese Business Community 
 
6.1.1. India - a high-end, low cost economy 
 
Japanese investors had often neglected their Indian operations and given their Indian outfits 
run-of- the-mill projects assuming that the Indian operations would not be able to handle 
high-end projects. A case in point is Kyocera. Kyocera, India had little importance till 2007. 
The breakthrough came and the relationship changed when Kyocera India delivered a 
product on time, which its European counterpart had failed to do. Not only did the product 
meet customer requirement, it was done at one-eighth the cost of the European unit. This 
prompted Kyocera, Japan to take a direct interest in its Indian operations. Subsequently, 
Kyocera India has become the major sourcing agent for the parent company’s products in the 25 
 
Japanese market. The product line of Kyocera India includes industrial designs - both 
mechanical and electrical, hardware, software, product test (regulatory test), and 
manufacturing support. It has also become the innovation hub of Kyocera, Japan. .Kyocera’s 
experience thus shows that the Japanese perception about Indian knowledge workers is 
unfounded. 
 
6.1.2 Labour Union – A Non-Issue 
 
The threat of labour unrest provoked by trade unionism was considered to be one of the main 
reasons for the hesitation displayed by Japanese industry to invest in India. However, 
interactions with Honda Siel, Sona Steering, YKK and MCC PTA India revealed that this 
threat was marginal and not as major as had been believed. Apart from TKM, none of the 
other companies have a history of confrontation with their labour unions. Five companies had 
taken pre-emptive steps to negate any possibility of confrontation by adopting a multi-faceted 
approach. A strategic recruitment policy, a rigorous induction programme and creation of 
platforms for continuous dialogue with the employees ensured a congenial environment. 
These companies created communication channels through suggestion schemes, quality 
circles, group meetings and morning assembly. These forums helped reduce the ‘distance’ 
between the supervisor and the shop-floor workers, as well as between workers and 
managers. Once a comfort level between them had been established, workplace stress, 
grievances and other issues were shared in an informal manner. This helped the organisations 
take corrective measures and nip potential conflicts in the bud. In a show of confidence about 
its shop-floor workers, Honda Siel has started the policy of promoting deserving shop-floor 
workers to managerial level. 
 
TKM had followed the Indian style of functioning of industry and had allowed trade unions 
to exist in their unit. As discussed under the section ‘Labour and Unions’, they learnt a few 
lessons. Initially TKM was led by its Indian HR managers to believe that workers in India do 
not understand sympathetic treatment and were used to being dealt with, with an iron-fist. A 
“we-versus-them” approach to industrial relations had been prevalent among Indian 
managers. Having faced conflicts with the union, today TKM practices a more humane 
approach towards labour issues. They have created many communication channels through 
which they can reach the workers. The individual worker is given importance and the 
supervisors are responsible for addressing and bringing to notice problems that a worker may 
face at work. All this has ensured the establishment of trust between workers and 
management. There is also a strong belief that synergy has been established as well. 
 
From the experience of these companies, one can suggest that Japanese business houses 
looking at India should not adopt the conventional Indian approach of ‘we vs. them’ but 
instead, ensure an egalitarian environment with several communication channels as practiced 
in Japan. 
 
6.1.3 Build Partnership 
 
During the incidents in January 2006, TKM had been very cautious in its approach and had 
kept open its communication channels with the state labour department. It had made its 
position clear at the beginning and did not give in to the union’s demands. This approach sent 
a strong signal to TKM’s labour union and also the national level unions. TKM also showed 
considerable patience in the dialogues that it had with the concerned ministries and took their 
advice seriously. All this helped them build a good reputation in Bangalore. Thus, working in 26 
 
partnership with the state government proved fruitful for TKM. The lessons drawn from 
TKM’s experience is one, it is important to take a firm position when there is a dispute and 
two, that it is vital to establish a relationship with the local and state government in India and 
keep them updated when there are conflicts with the union. 
 
6.1.4 India as an R&D Centre 
 
Among the eight companies that were surveyed, three companies - MCC PTA India, Kyocera 
and Eisai - are looking at India for their R&D activity. While Kyocera India is already an 
innovation hub, the other two will be opening their R&D centre by the 2010-2011. The 
primary reason for this is the availability of a cheap, talented labour pool with world class 
knowledge.
7 Further, technocrats and scientists have been trained to have an eye for quality 
and to understand the importance of diligence. The capacity to absorb technology is very 
strong in this talent pool and its creativity can help adapt technology to the local 
environment. A second reason is that, according to the three companies mentioned above, the 
cost of establishing an R&D centre is one-fourth of the cost required in Japan and one-third 
of that required in the U.K. A third reason is that, India is geographically located almost 
halfway between Japan and Europe. It has a blend of Asian and western cultures. The image 
makeover of India, during the past decade, has contributed to making India a favoured 
destination for multinationals. With an international lifestyle available at a relatively low 
cost, expatriate workers have little to grumble about. All this puts India at an advantage in 
terms of attracting talent from the east as well as the west. 
 
6.2 Indian Business Community 
 
6.2.1 Strong Influence of Japanese Style Management 
 
Japanese firms are very concerned about the quality of their products and the customer. They 
believe these concerns are embedded in their management practices. Thus, there is a strong 
influence of Japanese management ideas not only in subsidiaries but in joint ventures too. All 
the manufacturing units are laid out in the same manner as their Japanese counterparts. 
Quality circles, suggestion schemes, an egalitarian system and consensus decision making 
are all part of the Indian operations in companies that were visited. The Indian employees in 
all the companies undergo regular training to help them imbibe the Japanese way. Thus, the 
Japanese partners prefer the full involvement of workers at the plant level. They also require 
Indian managers to bring a strong sense of commitment to the workplace. 
 
6.2.2 Matching Philosophy and Work Culture 
 
While seeking partnerships with Indian business houses, the Japanese companies had given a 
lot of importance to the philosophy and spirit of the organisation they sought to collaborate 
with. Most of them looked at two or three potential partners, and made extensive studies of 
the profiles of these partners, followed by visits. The final choice was often because of the 
comfort level that the senior management of the Japanese company enjoyed with their Indian 
counterpart. The story of Sona Steering elucidates this point. From being a technical 
collaborator in which Koyo had little interest, Sona Steering was able to gain Koyo’s trust 
and become a lifelong partner. Sona Steering could achieve this by persuasion, diligence, 
quality compliance, and by showing a keen interest in learning the Japanese factory system. 
                                                 
7  The talent pool for R&D activity originates  from A-class  engineering/technical institutes 27 
 
This effort was implemented by the visionary leadership of its chairman. Thus for any Indian 
business seeking Japanese partnership, not only is the business consideration important, it is 
also essential to develop trust, understand the company’s philosophy and endure patiently the 
long-drawn period of acceptance. 
 
6.2.3 Driving Quality through Employees 
 
As mentioned earlier, all these companies put quality and customer care as the two most 
important driving forces. To achieve this, they require employees to follow instructions and 
show discipline and diligence. Thus, apart from the skill set, a major requirement for anyone 
seeking employment in a Japanese company is the right attitude of diligence, conformity and 
obedience. Managers bred by Indian business schools are taught to be individualistic, 
creative and competitive. But these qualities are contrary to the needs of the Japanese 
companies. Moreover, Indian culture promotes power and hierarchy, whereas Japanese 
companies prefer an egalitarian approach. This often leads to tension between Indian and 
Japanese managers. Thus, any Indian manager seeking opportunities in Japanese companies 
have to match not only their skill sets requirement but also their cultural fit. 
 
6.3 Indian Government 
 
6.3.1 Gap between the Education System and Industry Needs 
 
As mentioned above, India has the potential to become an R&D hub. During interactions, it 
also became evident that if the move to set up R&D centres in India proved successful, it 
might encourage these companies to use the Indian manufacturing base for high-end products 
for export to the rest of the world. This development is a very encouraging sign as it will help 
India move up the value chain. In view of this, the skill set gap needs to be addressed by the 
education system. There is an urgent need to upgrade the course curricula of the ITIs with 
subjects more relevant to industry needs. In the Bachelor’s and the Master’s degree of 
engineering courses too, the need is to develop curricula by inviting industry feedback. For 
instance, Satake does not recruit from the department of agricultural engineering of 
agricultural universities as the students from these institutes have little knowledge of the 
products that the company deals with. The company prefers to recruit mechanical engineers 
and train them to meet the company’s needs because the company finds that they are bright 
and have the familiarity with machines needed to help them grasp rice mill technology easily. 
The other problem encountered by these companies is that though private technical institutes 
have accreditation from the government, they do not produce students who are anywhere 
near desirable standards. Thus, the companies often lose valuable time and money during 
campus recruitment. 
 
6.3.2 Inadequate Hard Infrastructure 
 
As discussed earlier, the central government, which is in charge of national highways, has 
overlooked the requirement of MCC PTA India’s need for an arterial road that connects the 
highway to the Haldia plant. A similar problem exists with respect to access to Haldia port. 
The solution probably lies in shifting some of the infrastructural development work to the 
state government, as they can assess basic infrastructure requirements better. 
 
Manufacturing companies require fast movement of goods between ports and between the 
factory and the airport. During the first two phases of FDI inflows, most companies have 28 
 
located around these infrastructure facilities. Many states today are encouraging industrial 
bases in second-tier cities but these are usually poorly connected by air or rail. The HSIIDC 
in Bawal (Rewari district of Haryana) and Tarapur in Rajasthan are examples of an attempt 
to develop second-tier industrial locations. These two locations need to concentrate on 
providing unencumbered and smooth movement of goods between manufacturing units, dry 
docks, railways and the airport. 
 
6.3.3 Uncertain Political Climate 
 
It is known that most foreign investors look at continuity and stability as the two imperatives 
for doing business in any country. India has often puzzled the Japanese investor by the 
degree to which political considerations can cause shifts in policies. Most of the surveyed 
companies expressed concern about the general elections of April- May 2009. 
 
6.3.4 Need to Assess Technology 
 
Though bank loans have become easy and compliance requirements are now minimal, Satake 
and Sona Steering were of the opinion that a useful measure would be to have independent 
technical committees to assess the technology used in the companies and grade them 
accordingly. This would help these companies to authenticate their superiority over their 
competitors and get loans on more favourable terms and conditions. 
 
6.3.5 Abundance of Spurious Product Markets 
 
The inventor or the innovator of a product should be given leverage as well as protection 
against poor quality, low-priced fakes that are pushed into the market. Eisai strongly felt that 
stringent policies as well as policing of their implementation are important measures that 
would help to control the spurious product market. 
 
6.3.6 Inadequate Indian Patent Law 
 
Eisai’s learnt that their R&D activity for incremental innovation to increase the safety and 
efficacy of drugs was not allowed to be patented in India. Further, the laws do not protect 
data exclusivity for the trials conducted. All this hampers R&D activity. Though all other 
factors, especially the skill sets of workers are conducive for the pharmaceutical industry, the 
patent laws need to meet international standards. 
 
7.  Recommendations 
 
Since the BRIC
8 report, there has been growing interest in India. India’s image makeover has 
only furthered this cause. The current international economic recession, which India seems to 
have handled much better than many other countries, has contributed to its attractiveness. 
However, the study also indicates the steps that need to be taken in the following areas to 
make India a more appealing investment destination. The first four recommendations are 
directed at policy makers and the fifth one addresses the Indian business community seeking 
Japanese partnership. 
 
                                                 
8 BRIC is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China. This was coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001.The 
thesis proposed by Jim O’ Neill was that by 2050, these four  fast growing developing economies  together 
will eclipse the current richest countries of the world. 29 
 
7.1  Attention to R&D Activity 
 
The first relates to the field of research and development. One of the positive indications 
received from this study is that Japanese companies are looking at India for R&D activity. To 
make India an attractive destination, a two-pronged approach should be followed. One area 
that the policy makers need to concentrate on is to bring patent laws up to international 
standards. They should provide guidelines that help build an environment that is conducive to 
R&D activity. The area of patent laws and the Intellectual Property Act requires careful 
scrutiny, as it is very complex. In India, the concern is that the incremental innovations done 
to a product
9 to increase efficacy and safety cannot be patented. The other problem is that 
there is no guarantee of data exclusivity, either before or after the grant of patents. 
 
Another related area in R&D is providing the right kind of skill set. Though India is 
recognised for highly-skilled scientists and technocrats, it is important for policy makers to 
reform the education system to ensure a better match with industry requirements. Courses 
that lead to R&D talent pools should be made more rigorous and they should be 
benchmarked to international standards. The up-gradation of curricula should be on a 
continuous basis so that a synergy is established between the courses offered and the 
demands of the market. 
 
7.2 Competent Administration 
 
It is encouraging to see that companies that entered in the first phase applaud the changes in 
foreign direct investment policies made over the past two decades. It is also evident from 
their response to the ranking of obstacles, that for the majority of the companies, 
discontentment with the dealings of central, state and local authorities was low. The issue is 
more in the administrative structure and its operating methods.  Administration requires 
working at two levels. It needs to create transparency and become more e-enabled to 
facilitate faster operations. Though single-window approvals have become the norm, there is 
a lot to be achieved in ensuring smooth approvals. All this necessarily requires a more 
efficient functioning of the implementing agencies. Tax administration and custom duties in 
particular have to be reviewed to make them simpler. Further, refunding should be made 
easier and the onus should be placed on the administration. Creating transparency in its 
procedures and empowering local authorities to deal with each project on the basis of merit is 
crucial. Giving assistance to new investors in the form of easy availability of information, 
office space and hand-holding of new entrant into India with respect to identifying location, 
setting up distribution channel etc. can help attract investment. Training ground level 
administrators to become sensitive and proactive to companies needs would help matters 
 
7.3 Infrastructure development through Centre-State-Private Partnership 
 
Though this has often been repeated, it is imperative that steps are taken to improve vitally 
needed infrastructure. This includes measures to improve roads, ports and airports. One 
initiative that can be taken could be to allow a greater role in infrastructural development for 
states in areas in which the central government has so far been given sole responsibility. 
Most of the companies recommended a private- public partnership model. 
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7.4 Vigil on Spurious Product Market 
 
It is necessary to have a vigilant regulatory body to check cheap and spurious products from 
entering the market. This will give a fillip to Japanese investors because Japanese companies 
play on quality rather than price to gain entry into the market. 
 
7.5 Patience, Trust and Quality 
 
Indian companies looking at partnerships with Japanese companies should understand that 
Japanese investors are long-term players and go about the process of negotiation slowly. In a 
partnership, the Japanese seek not only business, but also commitment and trustworthiness. 
Thus, they might insist on several meetings before arriving at decisions. Often, there are 
minor setbacks as they test the waters by giving limited work or setting unachievable targets. 
In such situations, when the demands of the Japanese investor may often seem unreasonable, 
it is important to seek clarifications and endure their information seeking mind-set. Indian 
business houses intending to collaborate with Japanese companies need to develop the 
quality of patience and fortitude. Above all, Indian business should take outmost care to 
imbibe quality and detailing within the organisation to meet Japanese requirement in 
products delivered as well as its functioning. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The study highlights the fact that as India has taken steps to integrate more fully with the 
world economy, its foreign investment policies have become more investor friendly. A larger 
number of sectors have been opened up to foreign investment, making entry relatively 
simple. The Indian government and other bodies involved in policy making have become 
active in addressing the needs of foreign companies. Issues regarding bureaucratic delays, 
infrastructural improvement and labour issues are finally being addressed, a fact testified to 
by the fact that newer entrants have had far fewer issues to contend with as compared to 
earlier entrants. Earlier entrants have also been witness to positive changes in policy aimed at 
improving investment in the country and have, hence, been encouraged to expand and grow. 
 
The success stories of these companies also show that many of the perceptions about 
investing in India are either unfounded or outdated, including those regarding the quality and 
attitude of the workforce and Indian partners. 
 
Clearly, since the first days of liberalisation, Japanese companies operating in India have 
acquired a greater understanding of the Indian market while the Indian government has 
simultaneously moved towards creating a more investor friendly policy environment. Over a 
period of time, this should translate into greater investment interest and a greater flow of 
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This questionnaire is part of a research project which is trying to understand firm level 
experience in India with respect to Japanese companies. 
 
The idea behind this questionnaire is the gather information of your company from its 
inception in India to your current operations. 
 
The questionnaire is open ended to enable you to give information beyond the direct question 
asked. 
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Name of the Company: 
 
Year of Establishment in India: 
 




Organizational Structure (please attach): 
 





Firm Entry Strategy: 
 
1.  How did you make your choice of location and what were the reasons for your 











2.  Did you take help/legal assistance of any legal firm? Yes/No. If yes, please name the 
firm which provided Legal Assistance________________________ 
 
3.  Did you use the General Trading Corporation of Japan to find out investment 
opportunity? Yes/No.____________________________________________ 
 
4.  Did you use official Japanese Governmental wing to find out about investment 
opportunity? Yes/No. If yes, name please, __________________ 
 
5.  Did the investment policy of the Central/State play a role in determining investment 






Relevant for Partnership Company: 
 
6.  Did investment policy influence partnership with Indian counterpart? How do you 






7.  What criteria shaped your choice of partner? What were the key areas of negotiation 

































Establishment and Commencement of Operations: 
 
12.  Rank in order of highest level of obstacle 
1.  Central government of India    --------- 
2.  State  government        --------- 
3.  Local Authority        --------- 
4.  Human Resource        --------- 37 
 
5.  Legality       --------- 
6.  Under Developed Infrastructure --------- 
7.  Land Acquisition        --------- 
8.  Obtaining Approvals ( e.g. Environmental, Investment) 
 












15.  Was the skill set of employees to your requirement? 
 




16.  Did the company face problem with Local Community? Yes/No. If yes, please 









17.  What was your experience with local authority? 
  


























18.  Did the organization have problem between the Japanese Mangers and the Indian 
counterpart? Yes/No_______________________________________. 
 
19.  Was it a problem of understanding different working styles? Yes/No. If yes, then 






20.  How many Japanese worked in the Indian operations? Pleas do indicate their 




Year  No. of Japanese in 
Top Management 
No. of Japanese in 
Middle Management 
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Operation Beyond 5 Years: 
 







22.  Do you find the political environment more conducive for Foreign Investment? 
















24.  Given the recent global financial meltdown with falling demand, how is the company 
viewing its Indian operations? Is there any time frame for turn around in case, the 



















Background of the Companies 
 
Toyota Motor Corporation 
 
Toyota Motor Corporation is a Japanese multinational headquartered in Toyota city and 
Nagoya (both in Aichi prefecture) and in Tokyo. The beginning of the Toyota story can be 
traced to 1934. As a department of Toyota Industries, it created its first product – Type A 
engines – and in 1936, its first passenger car – the Toyota AA. Kiichiro Toyoda in 1937 
made the move of separating this automobile company from the Toyota group of industries. 
 
The journey of Toyota has been a story of growth – through the domestic market, followed 
by expansion into the USA and then to the rest of the world. Currently, the company owns 
and operates Lexus and Scion and has the majority shareholding stake in Daihatsu Motors, 
and a minority stake-holding in Fuji Heavy Industries, Yamaha Motors and Isuzu Motors. 
The company includes 522 subsidiaries. Toyota’s major expansion has been through its 
subsidiaries, though it has used the joint venture mode wherever it found entry restrictive. 
Toyota has manufacturing or assembly plants in Japan, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan and India in Asia, South Africa and Egypt in Africa, the 
United Kingdom, Poland, Turkey, France, Portugal and the Czech Republic in Europe, the 
United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Canada in the Americas,  Australia  
and  Russia. 
 
Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Limited (TKM) 
 
The Indian operations of Toyota were established in 1997 as a joint venture with the 
Kirloskar group of industries. Toyota Motor Corporation has 89% equity in TKM, with the 
Kirloskar group having the balance.  The enterprise is engaged in producing the four-
wheelers Corolla and Innova on the outskirts of Bangalore. By 2010, TKM will start 
operations in a second plant adjacent to the first, to produce a compact car. Toyota Kirloskar 
Auto Parts Pvt. Ltd. was set up by TKM in 2002 to supply auto parts. 
 
The philosophy of ‘Putting the Customer First’ forms the core of TKM’s business 
operations. Thus, the commitment to provide quality products at a reasonable price has been 
central focus.  Maintaining the traditions of the parent company, Toyota employees in India, 
too, are expected to embody these values, including those of environmental protection 
activities, in their daily work To “respect” the environment, says TKM, “we go to the source 
to identify and analyze the problems (Genchi Genbutsu), move forward to challenge 
conventional ideas and old habits and to improve further (kaizen) through teamwork.” 
10 
 
A study of Japanese firms is never complete without studying Toyota’s experience, as its 
management style has been portrayed internationally as the Japanese style of management.  
However, the question that would be most pertinent to this company is why it delayed its 
entry. 
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Honda Motor Co. Ltd. 
 
The Honda story began in 1948 with a single factory in the city of Hamamatsu in Japan. In 
50 years’ time, Honda was a global corporation selling automobiles, motorcycles and power 
products, posing a threat to the well-established companies of the West. The credit for 
Honda’s success today goes to the efforts put in by its founder Sichiro Honda and his partner 
Takeo Fujisawa. These entrepreneurs believed in seeking opportunities and creating value. 
‘Challenging the limits’ - a phrase commonly heard across the length and breadth of Honda, 
was  made popular by Soichiro Honda, who knew that in order to survive, his fledgling 
company had to out-think and out-perform its competitors every step of the way. This caused 
Honda to look towards changes as growth opportunities, be it in the product line or in 
management. The company has 397 subsidiaries across the world. 
 
Honda Motor Co. Ltd. operates under the basic principles of ‘Respect for the Individual’ and 
‘The Three Joys’ - commonly expressed as The Joy of Buying, The Joy of Selling and The 
Joy of Creating. ‘Respect for the Individual’ reflects Honda’s desire to honour the unique 
character and abilities of each individual person, trusting each other as equal partners in order 
to do their best in every situation. Based on this, ‘The Three Joys’ expresses their belief and 
desire that each person working in, or coming into contact with, their company, directly or 
through or their products, should share a sense of joy through that experience.
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Honda Siel India Pvt. Limited 
 
Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. (HSCI) was incorporated in December 1995 as a joint venture 
between Honda Motor Co. Ltd., Japan and Siel Ltd., a Siddharth Shriram group company, 
with a commitment to providing Honda’s latest passenger car models and technologies to 
Indian customers. HSCI’s state-of-the-art manufacturing unit was set up in 1997 at Greater 
Noida, UP with an investment of Rs.450 crore.  With the Indian market welcoming its 
products, Honda has expanded its operations to yet another manufacturing unit in Tarapur, 
Rajasthan. 
 
The foreign equity participation began with a 60:40 partnership. As the FDI policy changed 
in the automobile sector, Honda continued to increase its stake. At present, 97.4percent 
equity in the joint venture is with Honda Motor Company Ltd., with Siel Ltd possessing only 
2.6percent. In Japan, Honda is often thought of as a maverick company which has changed 
its policies very fast in order to gain global leadership. Thus its experience in India can 
provide useful lessons for future entrants. 
 
Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation 
 
Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation (MCC) is among Japan’s largest chemical companies. It 
was established in 1950 as a separate company. One of the three core business companies of 
the Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings group, MCC is the leader of the Japanese chemical 
industry.  The country’s largest diversified chemical company, with a list of subsidiaries and 
affiliates longer than a complex chemical formula, is a major player in petrochemicals, 
specialty chemicals, carbon and pharmaceuticals. Roughly a third of its sales come from 
petrochemicals such as ethylene, vinyl chloride, and raw materials for synthetic fibres. Its 
functional materials segment produces plastics and films. The company also makes 
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chemicals for semiconductor manufacturing as well as for data storage products such as CDs 
and DVDs. MCC also has a healthcare division that makes advanced pharmaceutical 
intermediates. 
 
Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation PTA (India) (MCPI) 
 
Due to the vast growth potential of polyester products in the South Asian region, MCPI set 
up its own Purified Terephthalic Acid  (PTA) operations in India in 1997, with the 
Government of West Bengal Toyota Tsuho Corporation and Marubeni Corporation each 
having a stake of 5%, Sumikin Bussan Corporation 2%, Sojitz Corporation 8 percent, 
Mitsubishi Corporation 9% and MCC 66%. The sprawling plant is located near the Haldia 
port. It also has two housing complexes and is modeled on the Japanese concept of an 
industrial city. The MCPI plant became operational for commercial use in April 2000 and has 
been achieving 100 percent capacity utilization since then.  Currently, it is in expansion mode 
and is setting up another plant adjacent to the existing plant. 
 
MCPI’s motto, ‘Good Chemistry for Tomorrow’ expresses its philosophy that the company’s 
mission, vision and objectives should correspond to the needs of the industry and society. 
The growth of MCPI is spearheaded by its vision of becoming a leading manufacturer of 
PTA in South Asia, backed by advanced technology. Further, it also envisions creating 
downstream industries in Haldia and West Bengal. The partnership of MCC with the West 
Bengal government has not only brought leading-edge technology into India, it is also one of 
the largest FDIs in India due to the nature of the sector. Given its political environment, 
Mitsubishi’s choice of West Bengal seems intriguing. All these considerations make this 
company an interesting case to study. 
 
Eisai Co. Ltd. 
 
This company was started by Toiji Naita in 1936 as Sakuragaoka Research Laboratory, an 
organization with a vision to produce drugs through research.  In 1941, Nihon Eisai Co. Ltd. 
was established in Saitama prefecture of Japan in an industrial estate.  In 1944, Sakuragaoka 
joined hands with Nihon Eisai on equal terms. The cardiotonic drug Neophyllin followed by 
the contraceptive drug Sampoon and the vitamin Juleva, established this company’s growth 
path. In 1951, the company changed its name to Eisai Co. Ltd. and has since spread its wings 
across the world.  Starting from a marketing office in Indonesia, this company today has both 
manufacturing outfits and R&D centre in USA, Europe and Asia. Today, the most important 
product line for this company is Methycobal, Pariet, Aricept and Humira. 
 
Eisai Pharmaceuticals India Pvt. Ltd. (Eisai India) 
 
Eisai Co. Ltd. established its 100% subsidiary in Mumbai in the year 2004.  Eisai entered the 
Indian market by using the licensing mode to sell two drugs through Glaxo Smith Kline and 
Unichem. The two important products Aricept and Zonegran are now marketed by its own 
sales force. Eisai India has set up a manufacturing unit in Vizag, Andhra Pradesh with a 
schedule to test its operations by July 2009 and start manufacturing Aricept for commercial 
use by December 2009. The drug will be sold in India as well as in the US.  In addition to 
this, the company has its global clinical trial unit and global data management operations in 
India. Eisai India, which is in its first phase of establishment, provides understanding of the 






Kyocera Wireless Corporate located in San Diego, California, was established in 2000 after 
Kyocera, Japan had acquired the American company Qualcom.  Following the acquisition, 
Kyocera Japan allowed the company to function independently.  Since the company did not 
do well financially, Kyocera, Japan intervened by sending across expatriates from Japan to 
the top and middle management levels. During its expansion mode, it started giving offshore 
assignments to a company called Sascom Telecom. The product line for Kyocera Wireless 
Corporation and Kyocera, Japan was of two types – the mobile phone and infrastructure with 
R&D activity in both the functions. Today Kyocera has divided itself into three functions – 
engineering, manufacturing and sales – and Kyocera India has positioned itself within the 
engineering and manufacturing divisions. 
 
Kyocera Wireless India 
 
In 2003, Kyocera Wireless India was established in Bangalore as a boot-up operation. 
Though it was a subsidiary for all operational purposes, it was treated as a third party getting 
directions from the USA. Interest in Kyocera India was because of cost effectiveness. Man 
month cost in India was one-third of that in the USA and one-fourth that in Japan. Further, 
the software specialist had the capability of delivering quality products. 
 
The breakthrough in getting importance came to Kyocera India in 2007. Kyocera India, 
gained recognition within its international operation, when, it delivered a product on time 
which its European counterpart had failed to do. Not only did the product meet customer 
requirement, it was done at one- eighth the cost of European unit. This initiated Kyocera, 
Japan to take direct interest in its Indian operations. Subsequently, Kyocera India has become 
the major sourcing agent of the parent company’s products for the Japanese market. The 
product line of Kyocera India includes industrial designs – mechanical and electrical, 
hardware, software, product test (regulatory test), and manufacturing support. It has also 
become the innovation hub of Kyocera, Japan. 
 
Among the many Japanese IT companies stationed in India, the choice of this company was 
made essentially to learn about the reasons for which the company has moved its innovation 





The initials YKK stand for Yoshida Kogyo Co. Ltd., started by Tadao Yoshida as Sanesu 
Shokai in 1934 and renamed as Yoshida Kogyosho in 1938. Going through ups and downs in 
1946, it emerged as the corporate house that one prefers to associate with. The YKK group is 
famous for manufacturing zippers and other fastening products, architectural items and 
industrial machinery. It has 118 affiliates across 70 countries in the world. Tadao Yoshida’s 
philosophy that ‘No one prospers unless he renders benefit to others’ continues to drive this 
global organisation in spirit.. YKK “seeks corporate value of higher significance” by 
pursuing innovative quality in production, marketing and human resource management. 
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YKK India Pvt. Ltd. 
 
The entry of YKK into India was facilitated by the change in government regulations that 
elevated the zipper industry from small scale to large scale manufacturing.  Thus in 1995, 
with FDI norms allowing for a 100% subsidiary, YKK India Pvt. Ltd. was established. The 
company with offices in New Delhi and its factory in HSIDC Investate Bawal (Rewari 
district, Haryana), started production in March 1997 of a range of popular zippers such as 
No. 3 & 5 Polyester Coil, No. 3 & 5 Vision and No. 3 & 5 Metal zippers. Subsequently, the 
range has been expanded with the addition of No. 2 & 3 invisible coil zippers. Metal zippers 
are produced in aluminum, golden brass, antique brass and antique silver finishes. Production 
of No. 7 metal zippers has also been started. YKK India also produces non-metallic slide 
fasteners. 
 
The plant has expanded its operations in phases. With completion of the expansion of the 
fourth phase in 2008, the production capacities of most of the items in its product basket have 
made a quantum jump. YKK India uses strong updated technology for its products and its 
quality orientation is at par with Japan. This company was a natural choice for a study of this 
kind because it has a long standing in Japanese industry. 
 
Koyo Seiko Co. / JTEKT 
 
Koyo Seiko Co. was established in 1921 to produce bearings. In the post-World War II 
period it moved to steering systems and expanded its operations into the USA in 1973.  Koyo 
Seiko Co. and Toyoda Machine Works Ltd. merged on January 1, 2006, and made a new 
start as JTEKT Corporation.  The company’s strength is centered on the automotive parts 
business and it possesses a strong technological base cultivated through long years of bearing 
and machine tool manufacturing. The corporate philosophy – ‘Seek to contribute to the 
happiness of people and the abundance of society through manufacturing that wins the trust 
of society’ – drives the organization to look at technology and products which generate the 
goodwill of its customers. 
 
Sona Koyo Steering Limited (SKSSL) 
 
SKSSL with its plant in Gurgaon, Haryana is part of the Sona group of companies. The 
relationship with Koyo was born out of a technical collaboration in 1985 to produce manual 
steering gear and columns that the Sona Company was already into. The collaboration had its 
teething problems with respect to technology transfer. But its joint venture with Maruti along 
with the boom in the automobile sector helped SKSSL establish not only its product line but 
also to successfully diversify and started innovating independent technology and producing a 
variety of new products. SKSSL had the choice of remaining only as a vendor to Maruti; 
however it decided to opt to grow independently. 
 
In 1995, following a visit by the then Koyo president, a technical collaboration with Koyo 
power steering gear was finalized and a joint venture company was formed in which Koyo 
had a nominal stake. Within two years, with growing trust, Koyo raised its stake to 20.5%. 
Today, JTEKT and Sona Automotive India Ltd are joint venture partners looking at 
producing electronic steering gear by locating a plant in Bawal, Haryana. This company 
started its relationship with Koyo with a technical collaboration and today stands as a trusted 





Satake was formed when Riichi Satake invented Japan’s first power driven rice mill in 1896.  
In 1940, its then president, Toshihiko, published the ‘theory of rice milling’ which became 
the basis of rice processing in Japan and later in the world. From a humble start, this 
company is one of the frontrunners in this sector today with a strong R&D support. Satake 
produces a comprehensive range of individual machines. 
 
Satake India Engineering Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Though Satake India started its operations in 1996, it set up its branch office only in 1999. 
Satake India provides machinery, installs them and takes care of their maintenance as well. It 
also undertakes the marketing of its products. Though the size of its presence is small with 
only around 17 employees, the company has a turnover of Rs. 180 crore. The choice of this 
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ICRIER – established in August 1981 – is an autonomous, policy-oriented, not-for-profit, 
economic policy think tank. ICRIER’s main focus is to enhance the knowledge content of 
policy making by undertaking analytical research that is targeted at improving India’s 
interface with the global economy. We have nurtured our autonomy by establishing an 
endowment fund, income from which enables us to pursue our priority research agenda. 
ICRIER receives other financial support from a number of sources including grants from the 
Government of India, multilateral international institutions, bilateral agencies and the private 
sector. 
 
A medium-term strategy that spells out ICRIER’s vision and focus areas can be found on its 
website www.icrier.org. ICRIER has its own code of conduct for undertaking research. 
 
To effectively disseminate its research findings, ICRIER organises workshops/ seminars/ 
conferences to bring together political leaders, policy makers, academicians, industry 
representatives and media persons to try and generate a more informed understanding on 
issues of major policy interest. ICRIER invites distinguished scholars and policy makers from 
around the world to deliver public lectures on economic themes of interest to contemporary 
India. 
 
ICRIER’s founding Chairman was Dr. K.B. Lall who led the organisation since its inception 
till 1992 when he handed over the Chairmanship to Mr. R.N. Malhotra (1992-1996). He was 
followed by Dr. I.G. Patel who remained Chairman from 1997 until his demise in July 2005. 
Amongst ICRIER’s founding members are Dr. Manmohan Singh, Dr. C. Rangarajan, Dr. 
M.S. Swaminathan, Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, Dr. R. J. Chelliah, Mr. Muchkund Dubey, Prof. 
Deepak Nayyar etc. ICRIER’s current Chairperson is Dr. Isher Judge Ahluwalia. 
 
ICRIER’s highly qualified in-house team of about 50 researchers is led by Dr. Rajiv 
Kumar, D.Phil in Economics from Oxford University and Ph.D from Lucknow University. 
The team includes several Ph.Ds from reputed Indian and foreign universities. In addition, we 
have around 25 external consultants working on specific projects. ICRIER’s office is located 
in the prime institutional complex of India Habitat Centre, New Delhi. 
 